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Abstract 
In this paper, we analyze a principal's optimal feedback policy in tournaments. We close a gap 
in the literature by assuming the principal to be unable to commit to a certain policy at the 
beginning of the tournament. Our analysis shows that in equilibrium the principal reveals in-
termediate information regarding the agents’ previous performances if these performances are 
not too different. Moreover, we investigate a situation where the principal is not able to credi-
bly communicate her information. Having presented our formal analysis, we test these results 
using data from laboratory experiments. The experimental findings provide some support for 
the model.  
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1. Introduction 
Tournaments or contest-like situations are ubiquitous in practice: Besides rent-seeking con-
tests, sports tournaments and beauty contests there are a variety of tournaments within organi-
zations such as promotion tournaments, contests for bonuses or non-monetary benefits (“em-
ployee of the month”). Due to this prevalence of tournaments, economic research has exten-
sively focused on the potential advantages and disadvantages of tournaments as well as on 
their optimal design. Theoretical approaches have been used to analyze rank-order tourna-
ments (e.g., in the seminal paper by Lazear & Rosen 1981 and also in Nalebuff & Stiglitz 
1983, O’Keeffe et al. 1984, Rosen 1986, Lazear 1989, Hvide 2002, Grund & Sliwka 2005, 
Clark & Konrad 2007, Kräkel 2007 or Münster 2007) as well as empirical studies using either 
field data (e.g., Eriksson 1999, Garicano & Palacios-Huerta 2005) or laboratory data (e.g., 
Schotter & Weigelt 1992, van Dijk et al. 2001, Sutter & Strassmair 2005).1 
Most of the models use a one-shot game to represent the tournament, where contestants 
choose effort once and are then ranked according to their relative performance. This, howev-
er, neglects the fact that real-world tournaments usually last for considerable time-periods, 
e.g. promotion tournaments. In such dynamic tournaments, the tournament organizer (hence-
forth, the principal) has additional instruments to affect the contestants’ (henceforth, agents) 
behavior. In other words, not all aspects of tournament design can be captured by a single 
one-shot game. As an important example, the principal can, in a dynamic tournament, decide 
on releasing information regarding the agents’ intermediate performances. 
With the current paper we close a gap in the literature by analyzing information revelation in 
dynamic tournaments theoretically as well as empirically as follows: We assume the principal 
to be unable to commit to a certain feedback strategy at the beginning of the tournament. This 
implies that the principal pursues the strategy that is optimal for her ex post, i.e. when inter-
mediate information becomes available. Moreover, we differentiate between two scenarios. 
While in the first scenario, the principal may always credibly reveal the performance informa-
tion, she is sometimes unable to credibly communicate the information in the second scenario, 
even if she wants to. This could be due to the type of information she receives regarding the 
contestants’ intermediate performances. If only informal or subjective information is available 
credibly revealing this information could be difficult. For example, in large organizations 
relative performance evaluation is often based on well-defined processes and scales as part of 
the performance management system. Performance reviews or management panels are usually 
only held once or twice a year. Information on intermediate performance mostly results from 
                                                 
1  An overview of experiments on tournaments is provided by Harbring & Irlenbusch (2005). For the advantages 
of using experimental data for analyzing labor market-related research questions see Falk & Fehr (2003). 
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subjective snap-shot impressions or informal information from discussions with colleagues. 
Finally, in addition to deriving theoretical predictions regarding this strategic framework 
which has not yet been analyzed before we also provide a first empirical test of our theoretical 
findings using data from a laboratory experiment. 
There is a recent strand of literature that discusses the role of intermediate performance in-
formation in tournaments. In contrast to our model Ederer (2004) and Aoyagi (2004), for ex-
ample, consider a situation, where the principal can commit herself at the beginning of the 
tournament, whether intermediate information should be released. If information is released, 
the agents know the intermediate result for sure and choose their efforts according to this in-
formation, i.e. efforts vary with this information. From an ex ante point of view, the principal 
then receives output, which is a function of expected efforts. If information is not revealed, 
the principal’s output is still a function of the agents’ efforts. These efforts, however, are now 
deterministic and depend on the agents’ expectations concerning the intermediate information. 
Comparing both scenarios, Ederer and Aoyagi show that the optimal feedback mechanism 
usually depends on the form of the effort cost function. Moreover, Gershkov & Perry (2006) 
consider the possibility of conducting midterm reviews. They demonstrate that it is always 
favorable to conduct a midterm review, if the results of the midterm review and the final re-
view are aggregated optimally. Otherwise, it may be better to solely monitor the performance 
at the end of the tournament. All these studies use a different strategic framework and they do 
not provide an experimental test of their predictions. Only Ederer & Fehr (2006) test Ederer’s 
results in a laboratory experiment and find some support for the model.2  
The paper is also related to previous work on the disclosure of private information in general. 
Examples include Grossman & Hart (1980), Grossman (1981) or Milgrom (1981). These pa-
pers analyze, whether individuals (e.g. sellers of goods) are interested in voluntarily revealing 
information (e.g. on product quality) or whether laws requiring positive disclosure are needed. 
Similar to our model, they find that it is often in the interest of the individuals to reveal infor-
mation, as a non-revelation of information is interpreted as an unfavorable signal. The current 
paper is the first to apply this logic to a tournament.  
Our main theoretical findings are as follows: Agents clearly react to the principal’s feedback 
decision. If feedback is provided, they choose lower efforts the more the intermediate perfor-
mances differ. If feedback is not provided, they interpret the non-revelation of information as 
a “bad” signal regarding the intermediate performances and, thus, reduce their efforts accor-
                                                 
2 Mohnen & Pokorny (2006) theoretically as well as experimentally analyze a situation where a principal has 
better information regarding the agents’ abilities and can reveal some – also false – information on these abili-
ties. However, the agents’ payoffs are based on linear wage contracts instead of a tournament. 
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dingly. This effect is most distinctive in the first scenario, where information revelation is 
always feasible. As a result, the principal always reveals her information unless the highest 
difference in intermediate results has occurred (in which case she is indifferent between re-
vealing and concealing the information). In the second scenario, where information revelation 
is not always feasible, the principal can conceal unfavorable information and claim that she is 
unable to communicate it. Here, agents react less extremely to a non-revelation of information 
so that the principal conceals information on high performance differences. 
The experimental results are well in line with these findings. As predicted, agents react to the 
revelation of higher intermediate differences by exerting lower efforts. Principals correctly 
anticipate this behavior and, as a consequence, are less likely to reveal their information if the 
initial situation is quite uneven. Moreover, the agents correctly take into account that a non-
revelation of information is more meaningful in the first than in the second scenario. Hence, if 
they are not informed about the intermediate results, they choose a relatively lower effort in 
the scenario, where information revelation is always feasible. Principals, however, do not ex-
pect the agents to react differently in the two scenarios and do not adapt their decisions ap-
propriately. Finally, we may disentangle behavior of agents being advantaged, i.e. agents hav-
ing a head start, or disadvantaged, i.e. agents being behind, by the revealed intermediate dif-
ference. Although effort should be symmetric in equilibrium we find that advantaged agents 
tend to exert higher efforts than disadvantaged agents. Interestingly, principals misjudge the 
situation and expect exactly the opposite. 
The paper is organized as follows: In the next section, the model is described and solved. 
Note that all formal proofs are relegated to Appendix A. Section 3 presents the setup of the 
experiment, the hypotheses tested as well as the experimental results. In Section 4, the paper’s 
main results are summarized and shortly discussed. Finally, Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. The model 
2.1 Description of the model and notation 
Consider a situation, in which two homogenous and risk-neutral agents, i=1, 2, compete in a 
tournament. The winner receives the winner prize 01 >w , while the loser prize is 12 ww <  
and both prizes are exogenously given. Such competition is usually of a dynamic type, i.e. 
agents do not choose effort once, but rather repeatedly over a certain period of time. In this 
model, we focus on the end of such a dynamic tournament and ask, whether the principal is 
interested in releasing information about the agents' earlier performances in case she cannot 
commit to a certain feedback policy ex ante (at the beginning of the tournament). 
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To analyze this problem in the simplest way, we consider the final period of a dynamic tour-
nament and assume the intermediate result before this period to be represented by a random 
variable θ that is distributed according to the pdf )(⋅f .3 Let )(⋅f  have a full and bounded 
support B. The principal observes the realization of θ, the agents do not. Yet, with probability 
]1,0[∈p  the principal is unable to credibly communicate the information to the agents. This 
may be the case, if the information is “soft” (e.g. information from subjective evaluations of 
the agents) so that the principal is tempted to misrepresent it.4 In this situation, the principal 
would always lie and announce the information that is most favorable to her. Accordingly, the 
agents would always ignore this information and the principal is just an inactive player. With 
probability p−1 , on the other hand, the information is “hard” so that the principal may de-
cide to conceal it, but cannot announce a realization of θ different from its true realization. 
Formally, she then chooses a strategy, which maps the observed intermediate result into an 
announcement policy or message { }nim ,θ∈ . Here, m=θ means that she informs the agents 
about the intermediate result and m=ni that she does not reveal her information. We assume 
that the agents do not know, whether the principal was unable or unwilling to reveal her in-
formation in case information is withheld. Therefore, they receive a signal { }ns ,θ∈ , which 
either equals θ=s  so that the agents learn the true realization of the intermediate result or 
ns = , in which case the agents learn that no information was revealed (for whatever reason).  
After having received the signal, the agents choose their final-period efforts 0≥ie . This 
means that each agent chooses a strategy )(sei , which maps the signal into an effort choice. 
Effort is costly to an agent and the costs are given by the increasing and convex function 
)( ieC . This cost function satisfies 0)0( =C , 0)0(' =C  and ∞=)(' ieC , for ∞→ie , where 
the last two conditions ensure that equilibrium effort is strictly positive, but finite. Efforts 
affect the (net) result of the final period, which is given by ε−−= 21 eez . The term ε  is a 
random variable that follows the pdf )(⋅g  ( )(⋅G  denotes the corresponding cdf). Further, as-
sume the realization of ε  to be independent of the realization of θ and )(θg  not to be con-
stant over B. 
After the final period, agent 1 is declared the tournament's winner and hence receives the 
winner prize, if 0>+ zθ . Otherwise, agent 2 wins the tournament. The agents choose their 
                                                 
3  Note that θ may alternatively be interpreted as the degree of heterogeneity among agents due to different capa-
bilities. Additionally, an uneven starting position could result from a situation where one agent is favored by his 
supervisor for some reason. 
4 Essentially, we assume the principal to be unable to commit to a truth-telling strategy. This is a quite sensible 
assumption, as we focus on feedback decisions under commitment problems.  
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efforts to maximize their expected income net of costs given the observed signal. The princip-
al chooses her announcement policy so as to maximize the sum of efforts in the final period. 
As we are dealing with an extensive-form game of imperfect information, we use perfect 
Bayesian equilibrium as solution concept. Moreover, throughout the paper, we focus on the 
analysis of equilibria in pure strategies. 
 
2.2 Solution to the model 
The model is solved by backward induction. Therefore, we start by determining the agents' 
effort choices. Agent 1 chooses 1e  so as to maximize 
 
(1) 
{ }[ ]
{ }[ ]
[ ] )()()(
)()(0
)()(0
121212
1212
12121
eCwwseeGEw
eCwwszrobPEw
seCwwzrobPEwEU
−−−++=
−−>++=
−−>++=
θ
θ
θ
θ
θ
θ
 
 
Similarly, agent 2 maximizes 
 
(2) [ ] )()()(1 2212122 eCwwseeGEwEU −−−+−+= θθ  
 
when choosing his effort. The first-order conditions to the two maximization-problems are 
given by5 
 
(3) [ ] 0)(')()( 12121
1
1 =−−−+=∂
∂ eCwwseegE
e
EU θθ  
(4) [ ] 0)(')()( 22121
2
2 =−−−+=∂
∂ eCwwseegE
e
EU θθ  
 
It is easy to see that the equilibrium is symmetric, i.e. eee :21 == , and this symmetric solu-
tion is given by [ ] )(')()( 21 eCwwsgE =−θθ . Equilibrium effort is increasing in both, 
)( 21 ww −  and [ ]sgE )(θθ . This is intuitive. A higher prize spread makes it more attractive to 
outperform the rival so that both agents choose to increase their effort. Further, [ ]sgE )(θθ  is 
                                                 
5 A sufficient condition for this first-order approach to be valid is that agent i’s objective function is strictly con-
cave in ei. To ensure this, we assume that C(·) is sufficiently convex in the following. 
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a measure of the intensity of competition. If [ ]sgE )(θθ  is rather high, the agents believe that, 
at the beginning of the final period, no one has a high head start. Accordingly, each has a rea-
listic chance of winning the tournament and competition is quite intense. As a consequence, 
effort is relatively high. Similarly, in case of a low [ ]sgE )(θθ , the intensity of competition 
and the agents' efforts are rather low. 
Note that the principal can affect [ ]sgE )(θθ  by trying to reveal information about θ . To ana-
lyze this possibility in detail, we now turn to the principal’s optimal feedback policy and start 
with the following definition: 
 
Definition 1: Let )( 21 BB  denote the set of parameter realizations for θ , for which the prin-
cipal chooses (not) to reveal her information, if she is able to. These sets form a partition of 
B, i.e. BBB =∪ 21  and ∅=∩ 21 BB . 
 
Making use of the definition, we characterize the principal's feedback policy by analyzing the 
equilibrium properties of the two sets 1B  and 2B . The following lemma provides a first step 
of this analysis: 
 
Lemma 1: If 2B  contains an element θ( ,  it must also contain all θ  with )()( θθ
(
gg < .6 
 
The message of Lemma 1 is very intuitive: If, for a certain intermediate result, the principal 
does not want to reveal her information, the same must also hold for all results that are strictly 
worse in the sense that the agents would choose lower efforts given the information was pub-
lic. 
Before we continue with our equilibrium characterization, we introduce a case distinction. In 
the first case, we assume 0=p  so that the principal is always able to credibly communicate 
her information to the agents. Further, we introduce the following second definition: 
 
Definition 2: Denote by (a) Θ  the set of (global) minimizers of )(θg  in B, (b) Θˆ  the set of 
(global) maximizers of )(θg  in 2B  and (c) Θ~  the set of (global) minimizers of )(θg  in 2B . 
 
Keeping this definition in mind, the following lemma can be derived. 
                                                 
6  The proofs of Lemma 1 and 2 as well as Propositions 1 and 2 can be found in detail in Appendix A. 
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Lemma 2: Let 0=p . Then, in equilibrium, we have )~()ˆ( θθ gg = , for all Θθ ˆˆ∈  and Θθ ~~∈ . 
 
Lemma 2 has an interesting implication. Given that the principal does not reveal her informa-
tion, the agents would not change their behavior, if (somehow) they were able to get to know 
the exact value of θ . The intuition for this result is as follows: Let θ  be such that the princip-
al does not reveal her information. Then, the agents base their effort decision on the mean of 
)(θg  conditional on θ  being an element of 2B . If )(θg  varies within 2B , this conditional 
mean is lower than )(θg , for at least one 2B∈θ . Hence, for this θ -realization, the principal 
would gain from deviating and revealing her information. It directly follows that, in equili-
brium, )(θg  must be constant, for all θ  in the set 2B . 
Combining Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, we directly obtain the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 1: Let 0=p . If θ  is such that )()( θθ gg > , for Θθ ∈ , the principal always 
reveals her information. Otherwise, she is indifferent between doing and not doing so. 
  
Proposition 1 implies that the agents always get to know the principal's information, if 0=p  
and the principal cannot commit to a "no-feedback strategy" ex ante. In other words, the prin-
cipal is always interested in providing full feedback (either directly by always revealing her 
information or indirectly by revealing her information unless the least favorable observation 
has been made). 
The result in Proposition 1 seems to be rather extreme. We, therefore, want to analyze, wheth-
er it continues to hold, if p is strictly positive. As the following proposition shows, this is not 
the case. 
 
Proposition 2: Let 0>p . Then, there is a cut-off value for )(θg , denoted by gˆ , with 
[ ])(ˆ)( θθ θ gEgg << , for Θθ ∈ , such that the principal reveals (conceals, is indifferent 
between revealing and concealing) her information, if gg ˆ),()( =<>θ . 
 
The main difference between Propositions 1 and 2 is the following: In the first scenario, the 
agents know, whether or not the principal was interested in revealing her information. If then 
the principal does not communicate her information, the agents interpret this as “bad” news. 
Hence, they expect one of them to have an extremely high head start and, therefore, choose a 
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very low effort. Consequently, the principal always reveals her information (unless the worst 
situation has occurred, in which case she is indifferent between revealing and concealing her 
information). 
In the second scenario, the agents do not know, whether the principal was unwilling or unable 
to reveal her information. If, in this case, the principal observes a quite uneven intermediate 
result, she may decide not to reveal her information and claim that she is not able to commu-
nicate it. In fact, the principal sometimes makes use of this possibility and conceals her infor-
mation in highly uneven situations. 
 
3. The Experiment 
3.1 Experimental Design 
The experiment was conducted at the Cologne Laboratory for Economic Research in April 
2007. All sessions were computerized using the experimental software z-Tree (Fischbacher 
1999). We had three sessions for each of the two treatments - the Cred-treatment, where the 
principal was always able to credibly communicate her information (i.e. 0=p ) and the No-
Cred-treatment, where we imposed 32=p . In each session, 30 students of different disci-
plines were involved in the experiment: 20 took part as agents and 10 as principals. As every 
candidate was only allowed to participate in one session, in total 180 students participated in 
the experiment. A session consisted of 9 identical rounds and lasted for about 90 minutes. 
At the beginning of each session, the instructions were handed out and read aloud by the ex-
perimenter.7 Thereafter, the participants were seated in cubicles. The assignment to the cubi-
cles was done by drawing cards. Each cubicle and, accordingly, each subject was anony-
mously assigned a role as principal or agent, which she/he kept for the entire experiment. In 
each round of the experiment, 10 groups consisting of one principal and two agents were 
formed. This matching process was organized such that no participant could meet another 
participant twice.  
In the experiment, each agent’s performance (in a given round) was evaluated according to his 
output which we denoted by “result” iiii ey εθ ++= , i.e. the agent with the higher value for 
iy  was declared the winner of the tournament. In this context, iθ  denotes a “starting number” 
and iε  an additional “random number” that were assigned to agent i. Note that this represen-
tation is equivalent to the representation in Section 2, with 21: θθθ −=  and 12: εεε −= . Dur-
                                                 
7  A translation of the instruction sheet can be found in Appendix B. Original instructions in German are avail-
able from the authors upon request. 
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ing the experiment we denoted the expression for the output excluding the starting number, 
p
iy  = iie ε+ , as agent i’s “preliminary result”. 
At the beginning of each round, the agents were assigned their starting numbers, which were 
randomly drawn by the computer. In particular, one (randomly selected) agent in each group 
was assigned a starting number of 0. The other agent’s starting number in this group was ei-
ther 0, 20, 40, 60, or 80, each realized with a probability of 0.2. As 21: θθθ −= , we have fea-
sible differences between starting numbers of { }80,60,40,20,0,20,40,60,80 −−−−∈θ , with 
{ } 2.00 ==θrobP  and { } 1.0== krobP θ , for all other 0≠k .8 
Each principal got to know the starting numbers of both agents belonging to her group, while 
the agents did not receive any information in the beginning of the round. The principal could 
then decide to reveal the information to the agents. In the Cred-treatment, the principal’s deci-
sion to reveal or conceal the information was always carried out and the agents were naturally 
informed about the principal’s decision. In the NoCred-treatment, on the other hand, the cor-
responding decision of the principal was followed by a move of nature. If the principal de-
cided to inform the agents about the starting differences, the move of nature determined af-
terwards whether this was actually possible. With probability 31  the principal was able to 
reveal her information, with probability 32  she was not. After the move of nature, the agents 
were informed about their starting numbers or not. In the latter case, they did not know 
whether the starting numbers were intentionally concealed by the principal or whether the 
principal was willing to reveal the information, but unable to inform the agents. In a next step, 
the subjects had to submit a belief concerning the behavior of the group member(s) in the oth-
er role. Accordingly, the principal had to express a conjecture concerning the agents’ effort 
choices given the realization of the specific starting numbers in this round, i.e. the principal 
had to state each agent’s expected effort given that he or she was advantaged or disadvantaged 
by the realization of the starting numbers to a certain extent. 
 
                                                 
8 In contrast to the model in Section 2, we assume θ  to be discrete here. This is innocuous, as all results from the 
previous section hold for a discrete θ as well.  
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Principal decides on 
revelation
Agents state belief on 
principal‘s decision
Principal states belief on 
decisions of agents
Agents decide on effort
Realization of 
starting numbers
Revelation of starting numbers
if principal revealed
(NoCred: Revelation only with probability of 1/3) 
 
Figure 1: Sequence of decisions 
While the principal decided on the revelation of the starting numbers the agents had to specu-
late, for which of the five differences of starting numbers (0, 20, 40, 60, 80)9 the principal 
would reveal her information and for which she would not (see also Figure 1). Thereafter, 
they had to choose an integer between 0 and 100 reflecting their effort choice incurring costs 
of 2)(
12
1)( ii eeC = . Payoffs and costs were measured in the fictitious experimental currency 
“Taler”. The instructions sheet included a table with a full overview of the costs regarding 
each feasible decision. Following the effort choices, the computer determined the realization 
of 1ε  and 2ε . Both these random numbers were independently and individually drawn from 
{ }50,49,...,0,...,49,50 −−  for each agent in each round. Every number from this set was equally 
likely to be drawn, hence the random numbers approximately follow a uniform distribution on 
[ ]50,50− .10 As 12: εεε −= , the composed random variable ε  approximately follows a trian-
gular distribution with support [ ]100,100− , which means that )(⋅g  is given by 
 
(5) 
⎪⎪
⎪
⎩
⎪⎪
⎪
⎨
⎧
≤−+≤−+−
≤−+≤−−++
=−+
otherwise
eeforee
eeforee
eeg
0
1000
000,10100
1
0100
000,10100
1
)( 21
21
21
21
21 θθ
θθ
θ  
 
                                                 
9 Note that we decided to give starting differences as absolute amounts |θ|, such that only five differences were 
feasible to facilitate the situation for the participants. 
10 Notice that Propositions 1 and 2 hold for discrete random variables ε1 and ε2, too. The approximation by a 
continuous distribution is, thus, only made to simplify the following analysis. 
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Finally, the subjects’ payoffs were determined. The principal’s payment was equal to the sum 
of the two agents’ outputs piy  excluding the starting numbers, i.e. the sum of the “prelimi-
nary results”.11 Moreover, she obtained a bonus of 50 Taler for every correct effort conjecture. 
For every unit that her conjecture deviated from the actual effort, the bonus was reduced by 1 
Taler, but could not become negative. 
The agent winning the tournament, i.e. the agent with the higher output iy received a prize of 
800,11 =w , while the loser prize was set to 8002 =w . Further, the agents were rewarded for 
correct beliefs, too. If an agent correctly anticipated the principal’s decision for the actually 
drawn difference in starting numbers, he received an additional bonus of 100 (and nothing 
otherwise). 
After each round, the principal was informed about the agents’ preliminary results, the results 
and her own payoff resulting from the agents’ effort decisions in the tournament. Similarly, 
the agents were informed about the realization of both agents’ starting numbers – also if the 
principal or nature had decided not to reveal the starting numbers in this round – whether or 
not they had won the tournament and their own payoff, i.e. the winner or loser prize reduced 
by the effort costs. Note that the agents were not informed about the principal’s decision in 
the NoCred-treatment if the starting numbers were not revealed to them such that they could 
not infer whether this was due to the principal’s decision or nature. After the final round, all 
participants (principals and agents) were additionally informed about the sum of their bonus 
payments resulting from the beliefs in each round. 
At the end of the experiment, payoffs were converted into Euro at an exchange rate of 1,000 
Taler per 1 Euro. All subjects were paid anonymously. 
Note that we assume specific functional forms in the experiment. Therefore, we are able to 
derive closed-form solutions for the equilibrium efforts. Using (3), (4) and 2)(
12
1)( ii eeC = , it 
is easy to see that the optimal effort simplifies to12 
 
                                                 
11 We do not include the starting number into the payoff function of the principal as we want to avoid that the 
principal benefits from the realization of a high starting difference which could then distort the agents’ effort 
decisions. 
12 Agent 1’s objective function is strictly concave in e1, if [ ] 0)('')()(' 12121
1
2
2
1 <−−−+=∂
∂
eCwwseegE
e
EU θθ . 
In our example, this condition simplifies to [ ] 061)('000,1 21 <−−+ seegE θθ . As 000,101)(' 21 ≤−+ eeg θ  
(see (5)), this condition is always fulfilled. The same is true for the second agent. This implies that the two 
agents’ objective functions are strictly concave so that the effort given by (6) is indeed optimal. 
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(6) 
[ ]
[ ]sgE
wwsgEe
)(000,6
)()(6 21
θ
θ
θ
θ
⋅=
−⋅=
 
 
It is important to note that the equilibrium effort of each agent only depends on the size of the 
starting difference and that efforts are symmetric in equilibrium although one agent is advan-
taged and the other is disadvantaged by the starting difference. 
In the Cred-treatment, the principal is always able to credibly communicate her information 
(i.e. 0=p ). The optimal efforts directly follow from (5) and (6) (see also Table 1). 
Table 1: Theoretical predictions based on parameters of experimental design 
  Realization of starting differences |θ| 
  0 20 40 60 80 
Principal’s decision in equilibrium Cred reveal reveal reveal reveal indifferent  
NoCred reveal reveal reveal conceal conceal 
Agent’s decision in equilibrium if 
starting numbers are known 
Cred 
60 48 36 24 12 
NoCred 
Agent’s decision in equilibrium if 
starting numbers are unknown 
Cred 12 
NoCred 30 
 
In the NoCred-treatment, we imposed 32=p . Here, we can show that the principal conceals 
her information if 80=θ  and 60=θ , while in all other situations she is interested in reveal-
ing it. To see this, assume the principal to use this strategy: If the agents are not informed 
about θ , they choose effort ( ) 30
5
)6048362412(32
2
)2412(31* =++++⋅++=neNC . Then, 
it is straightforward to check that the principal’s strategy is a best response to the agents’ 
strategies and vice versa. It remains to be shown that there is no other equilibrium. To show 
this, assume the principal to also conceal 40=θ . This implies the agent’s effort ( )neNC*  to 
change to ( ) 32
5
)6048362412(32
3
)362412(31' =++++⋅+++=neNC . It directly follows 
that the principal would then prefer to deviate and reveal 40=θ , as this would yield an in-
crease in effort. Similarly, we can eliminate all other equilibrium candidates. 
Altogether, the agents choose the same efforts in both treatments, if they are informed about 
θ . Otherwise, the efforts differ and are given by ( ) 12* =neC  and ( ) 30* =neNC . 
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3.2 Hypotheses 
Our hypotheses directly follow from our theoretical model derived in Section 2 as well as its 
parameterization outlined in the last subsection (see Table 1). We derive hypotheses regarding 
each treatment and describe the resulting differences between both treatments. The first two 
hypotheses refer to the principal’s decision as well as the agents’ decisions in each round. 
HYPOTHESIS 1 – DECISION OF PRINCIPAL: 
a. In the Cred-treatment, the principal always reveals the starting difference except for 
the largest starting difference of 80=θ . 
b. In the NoCred-treatment, the principal always reveals the starting difference except for 
the two largest starting differences of 60=θ  and 80=θ . 
Note that it follows from the above hypothesis that the principal should reveal the second 
largest starting difference of 60=θ  more often in Cred than in NoCred. As the principal is 
indifferent between revealing and not revealing the largest starting difference in Cred we 
might expect that she will also more often reveal 80=θ  in Cred. 
Remember that the equilibrium efforts of agents are symmetric and only depend on the size of 
the starting difference given as an absolute amount (if revealed) which is reflected by hypo-
thesis 2 on the decisions of the agents (see also Table 1). If the starting difference is not re-
vealed to the agents we conjecture that they make an assumption on the realization of the 
starting difference and derive their effort decision accordingly. This assumption is based on 
the principal’s behavior in equilibrium as well as the realization of the random move in No-
Cred. 
HYPOTHESIS 2 – DECISION OF AGENT: 
a. If the agents learn the starting difference effort is exerted according to the theoretic 
prediction (i.e. ( ) 600* ==θe , ( ) 4820* ==θe , ( ) 3640* ==θe , ( ) 2460* ==θe , 
( ) 1280* ==θe ). This holds in both treatments. 
b. If, in the Cred-treatment, the agents do not learn the starting difference, effort is based 
on the assumption that the starting difference is maximal, i.e. ( ) 12* =neC . 
c. If, in the NoCred-treatment, the agents do not learn the starting difference, the corres-
ponding effort is ( ) 30* =neNC . 
From hypothesis 2b and 2c it follows that average effort should be higher in NoCred than in 
Cred if the starting difference is not revealed to the agents. 
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Each type of player was also asked to state her/his beliefs about the participants in the other 
role in each round. Thus, our next hypotheses refer to the subjects’ beliefs. The conjectured 
beliefs are in line with the above hypotheses on each participant’s decision. Thus, the ex-
pected effort for an unknown starting difference should be higher in NoCred than in Cred. 
HYPOTHESIS 3 – BELIEF OF PRINCIPAL: 
a. If the agents learn the starting difference, the principal expects them to choose effort 
according to the theoretical prediction (i.e. ( ) 600* ==θe , ( ) 4820* ==θe , 
( ) 3640* ==θe , ( ) 2460* ==θe , ( ) 1280* ==θe ). This holds in both treatments. 
b. If, in the Cred-treatment, the agents do not learn the starting difference, the principal 
expects them to choose ( ) 12* =neC . 
c. If, in the NoCred-treatment, the agents do not learn the starting difference, the princip-
al expects them to choose ( ) 30* =neNC . 
The beliefs of the agents are in line with the hypothesis on the principal’s decision, which has 
been derived before. The agents should expect the principal to reveal the starting difference 
more often in Cred than in NoCred in case of the second largest starting difference and prob-
ably also the largest difference. 
HYPOTHESIS 4 – BELIEF OF AGENT: 
a. In the Cred-treatment, the agents expect the principal to always reveal the starting dif-
ference except for the largest starting difference 80=θ . 
b. In the NoCred-treatment, the agents expect the principal to always reveal the starting 
difference except for the two largest starting differences 60=θ  and 80=θ . 
From the agents’ perspective the revelation of the starting difference induces some degree of 
heterogeneity among agents as one agent is favored in the form of a head start and the other 
agent is handicapped. According to our theoretic prediction efforts should be symmetric in 
equilibrium. Other experimental studies, however, indicate that the effort of advantaged 
agents tends to be higher than that of disadvantaged agents (see Schotter & Weigelt 1992). It 
seems, therefore, interesting to disentangle the behavior of advantaged and disadvantaged 
agents regarding actual effort choices and also the principals’ beliefs.  
HYPOTHESIS 5 – EFFECT OF DISCRIMINATION OF AGENTS: 
a. Effort exerted by the agents is symmetric and does not differ between agents being 
advantaged or disadvantaged by the realization of the revealed starting difference. 
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b. Principals expect the agents’ efforts to be symmetric such that effort choices of agents 
being advantaged or disadvantaged by the realization of the revealed starting differ-
ence do not differ. 
 
3.3 Results 
The statistical analysis will be guided by the above hypotheses based on our theoretic predic-
tions. We will complement the analysis of each treatment by a comparison of both treatments. 
 
3.3.1 Decision of Principal 
An overview of the average tendency of each principal to reveal the starting difference to the 
agents is depicted by Figure 2. It seems obvious that the principal decides to reveal lower 
starting differences more often than higher starting differences. 
Revelation by Principal in %
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Figure 2: Revelation by principal in % for each starting difference 
Table 2 supplies the average tendency of each principal to reveal the starting difference and 
shows whether the principals decide to reveal each starting difference significantly more often 
than not by applying the Binomial Test. Averages already indicate that the principal does not 
always choose to reveal the starting difference for the differences conjectured above but 
seems to show a decreasing tendency to reveal the differences if they are becoming larger. We 
find that in both treatments the smallest starting differences tend to be revealed while, addi-
tionally, in Cred the two largest differences tend to be concealed (see results of Binomial Test 
in Table 2).  
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Table 2: Average percentage of revelation per principal  
 Realization of starting differences |θ| 
 0 20 40 60 80 
Cred 75.48+++ 62.93++ 39.10 31.88– – 39.51– 
NoCred 70.51+++ 78.74+++ 61.67 42.90 42.71 
Mann-Whitney U test 
(one-tailed) 
ns α = 0.075 α = 0.029 ns ns 
By using the Binomial Test (one-tailed) we state the level of significance at which the null hypothesis can be 
rejected in favor of the alternative hypothesis that the starting difference is more often revealed than not (+) 
respectively less often revealed than revealed (–): 
+  weakly significant:  0.05 < α ≤ 0.10 
++  significant:   0.01 < α ≤ 0.05 
+++  highly significant:  α ≤ 0.01 
–  weakly significant:  0.05 < α ≤ 0.10 
– –  significant:   0.01 < α ≤ 0.05 
– – –  highly significant:  α ≤ 0.01 
To support these first results we ran probit regressions described by Table 3 below and used 
the decision of the principal as a dummy variable explained either by the absolute amount of 
the five starting differences (regressions (1) and (3)) or by binary variables for each of the 
starting difference being 1 for the realization of a certain starting difference and 0 otherwise 
(regressions (2) and (4)).  
Table 3: Probit regressions13 with principal’s decision as dependent variable (revelation = 1, 
no revelation = 0) and robust standard errors over subjects 
 Cred NoCred 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Startingdifference -0.0123***  -0.0105**  
 (0.0031)  (0.0043)  
Difference0  0.845***  0.669** 
  (0.21)  (0.33) 
Difference20  0.655**  0.938***
  (0.28)  (0.32) 
Difference40  0.127  0.379 
  (0.19)  (0.35) 
Difference60  -0.159  0.223 
  (0.22)  (0.22) 
Constant 0.524*** -0.272 0.686*** -0.180 
 (0.16) (0.17) (0.20) (0.24) 
Observations 270 270 270 270 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
                                                 
13  We also used fixed effects regressions to check the robustness of our results with the principal’s decision as a 
dependent variable; the same coefficients as shown in Table 3 are significant. 
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We find that obviously the principals’ tendency to reveal significantly increases with a de-
creasing starting difference. Moreover, principals significantly more often reveal the two 
smallest starting differences compared to the largest starting difference 80=θ  which is in 
line with our above observations. 
We can summarize these results by describing the observations on our first hypothesis:  
OBSERVATION ON HYPOTHESIS 1a and 1b: In both treatments, the principal shows a de-
creasing tendency to reveal the starting difference if the difference increases. The princip-
al tends to reveal the two smallest starting differences of 0=θ  and 20=θ  and reveals 
them significantly more often than the largest starting difference of 80=θ . The two 
largest starting differences 60=θ  and 80=θ  tend not to be revealed in Cred.  
Comparing the average tendency to reveal the starting difference per principal between both 
treatments by using the Mann-Whitney U test (see also Table 2) we find that the principal 
neither reveals the second largest starting difference of 60=θ  nor the largest starting differ-
ence of 80=θ more often in the Cred-treatment than in the NoCred-treatment. Although our 
hypotheses can only partly be confirmed we may state that the principals in both treatments 
seem to understand that it is beneficial to reveal rather low starting differences. 
We also checked whether the principals’ decisions change over rounds, e.g. whether princip-
als learn to reveal the starting difference more often in later rounds. However, we find no in-
dication for a systematic change in the principals’ behavior.14  
 
3.3.2 Decision of Agent 
The average effort of each agent for each revealed starting difference and also for the situation 
of an unknown starting difference is depicted by Figure 3. 
                                                 
14  We checked for a trend over rounds by including the number of the period in the regressions reported in Table 
3. Moreover, we ran separate regressions including the period as independent variable for the revelation of each 
starting difference as dependent variable. Finally, we also checked for the significance of the Spearman Rank 
correlation coefficient. 
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Figure 3: Average effort per starting difference (absolute value) revealed and if unknown  
Table 4 provides an overview of the average efforts of each agent compared to the theoretic 
prediction for each starting difference. While the average efforts seem to be well in line with 
the theoretic prediction regarding the two smallest starting differences they seem to be above 
the prediction for larger differences and particularly for unknown differences. By using the 
Binomial Test we may statistically test whether the average efforts per agent are more often 
below or above the equilibrium prediction. The results are given in Table 4 and confirm our 
first impression.  
Table 4: Average effort of agents per starting difference and if unknown  
 Realization of starting differences |θ|  
 0 20 40 60 80 |θ| unknown 
Cred Average effort 63.15 46.66 47.37 56.09++ 30.35++ 45.62+++ 
Equilibrium 60 48 36 24 12 12 
NoCred Average effort 56.16 51.49++ 45.00 45.33+++ 34.82++ 51.95+++ 
Equilibrium 60 48 36 24 12 30 
Mann-Whitney U test  
(one-tailed) 
ns ns ns ns ns α = 0.062 
By using the Binomial Test (one-tailed) we state the level of significance at which the null hypothesis can be 
rejected in favor of the alternative hypothesis that the average effort per agent is more often above the equili-
brium prediction than below: 
+  weakly significant:  0.05 < α ≤ 0.10 
++  significant:   0.01 < α ≤ 0.05 
+++  highly significant:  α ≤ 0.01 
 
Although average efforts obviously deviate from the theoretic prediction – particularly for 
large starting differences – we find that they are qualitatively in line with theory as effort in-
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creases with a decreasing starting difference revealed. This is confirmed by running regres-
sions using effort as dependent variable and the starting difference in absolute amount as in-
dependent variable (see Table 5).  
Table 5: Regressions15 with effort as dependent variable, robust standard errors over subjects 
 Cred NoCred 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Startingdifference -0.273***  -0.259**  
 (0.075)  (0.099)  
Rev_difference0  13.18***  4.556 
  (4.86)  (6.34) 
Rev_difference20  0.0149  -1.538 
  (4.66)  (5.84) 
Rev_difference40  -1.676  -8.626 
  (5.86)  (6.96) 
Rev_difference60  6.250  -5.069 
  (8.67)  (6.90) 
Rev_difference80  -14.53**  -19.90***
  (5.80)  (6.68) 
Constant 58.43*** 47.85*** 56.75*** 52.44*** 
 (3.37) (3.93) (5.65) (2.39) 
Observations 280 540 130 540 
R-squared 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.03 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Moreover, particularly the comparison of the average effort exerted in case of an unknown 
starting difference with the average efforts exerted for the different starting differences re-
vealed seems important to analyze. We, therefore, ran regressions (2) and (4) summarized by 
Table 5 using dummy variables for the different starting differences revealed, e.g. 
Rev_difference0 equals 1 for a revealed starting difference of 0=θ  and 0 otherwise. Thus, 
we may analyze the effect of the revelation of each starting difference compared to an un-
known starting difference. We find for both treatments that the effort in case of the largest 
starting difference is significantly smaller than if the starting difference is not revealed. Thus, 
one could conclude that in both treatments the largest starting difference of 80=θ  should 
not be revealed by the principal. Moreover, we find that it is beneficial for the principal to 
reveal the smallest starting difference of 0=θ  in Cred as effort is significantly larger than in 
                                                 
15  Again, we used fixed effects regressions with the agents’ decisions as a dependent variable, too; the same 
coefficients as shown in Table 5 are significant. Additionally, the revelation of a starting difference of 40=θ  
turns out to have a significantly negative effect on effort in NoCred compared to the case of non-revelation. 
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case of an unknown starting difference. 
Again, we also checked for a change of behavior over rounds and do not find any indication 
for a trend of efforts exerted. 
We may summarize our findings by describing our observations on hypothesis 2: 
OBSERVATION ON HYPOTHESIS 2a: Average effort is significantly decreasing with an in-
creasing starting difference revealed in both treatments. Moreover, in both treatments ef-
fort is significantly lower for the largest difference of 80=θ  if revealed than for an un-
known difference (and higher for the lowest difference in Cred). If the agents learn the 
starting difference effort is significantly higher than theoretically predicted for the two 
largest starting differences 60=θ  and 80=θ  and, additionally, for 20=θ  in NoCred.  
OBSERVATION ON HYPOTHESIS 2b and 2c: In both treatments effort is significantly high-
er than theoretically predicted if the agents do not learn the starting difference. 
Both average efforts for the situation of an unknown starting difference are much higher than 
theoretically predicted but their comparison yields a result which is qualitatively in line with 
theory as effort in NoCred is significantly higher than in Cred for unknown differences (see 
Table 4). Note that there is no significant difference between average efforts for each revealed 
starting difference between both treatments as predicted by theory. 
 
3.3.3 Belief of Principal 
We also elicited the subjects’ beliefs regarding other participants’ behavior to shed some light 
on potential motives for the actual decisions made. The principal has to state in each round 
which effort she expects from each of the two agents. Figure 4 provides a first overview of the 
principal’s beliefs. 
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Figure 4: Average effort expected by principal per starting difference (absolute value) re-
vealed and if unknown to agents 
We hypothesized that the principal’s beliefs are also in line with our theoretic prediction. Ta-
ble 6 summarizes the average beliefs as well as the results of non-parametric testing. Similar 
to average efforts described before average expected efforts seem to be above the equilibrium 
prediction which is again more pronounced for large starting differences and an unknown 
starting difference. The results of the Binomial Test given in Table 6 are in line with this im-
pression. 
Table 6: Average effort expected by principal per starting difference and if unknown  
 Realization of starting differences |θ|  
 0 20 40 60 80 |θ| unknown 
Cred Average effort 66.28+ 61.96 54.74+ 43.09 35.81+++ 41.78+++ 
Equilibrium 60 48 36 24 12 12 
NoCred Average effort 74.25 54.89 55.91+++ 58.27+++ 32.69+ 
 
45.00+++ 
Equilibrium 60 48 36 24 12 30 
Mann-Whitney U test  
(one-tailed) 
ns ns ns ns ns ns 
By using the Binomial Test (one-tailed) we state the level of significance at which the null hypothesis can be 
rejected in favor of the alternative hypothesis that the average belief on effort per principal is more often above 
the equilibrium prediction than below: 
+  weakly significant:  0.05 < α ≤ 0.10 
++  significant:   0.01 < α ≤ 0.05 
+++  highly significant:  α ≤ 0.01 
 
We also ran regressions using the principal’s beliefs regarding average effort in each round as 
dependent variable (see Table 7). The results show that the effort expected by the principal 
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seems to decrease with an increasing starting difference (regressions (1) and (3)) which is in 
line with actual effort choices by the agents and also with our theoretic prediction.  
Table 7: Regressions16 with expected effort as dependent variable, robust standard errors over 
subjects 
 Cred NoCred 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Startingdifference -0.405***  -0.394***  
 (0.087)  (0.080)  
Rev_difference0  27.14***  28.61*** 
  (5.32)  (5.89) 
Rev_difference20  14.85**  9.432* 
  (6.20)  (5.07) 
Rev_difference40  11.44  10.72 
  (7.68)  (8.67) 
Rev_difference60  -1.049  11.43* 
  (7.90)  (6.67) 
Rev_difference80  -5.379  -12.65***
  (5.56)  (4.57) 
Constant 67.70*** 42.02*** 70.19*** 45.19*** 
 (4.22) (3.38) (4.88) (2.80) 
Observations 140 270 65 270 
R-squared 0.20 0.19 0.22 0.13 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Analyzing the effect of the revelation of each starting difference compared with an unknown 
difference by including dummy variables for each difference revealed (regressions (2) and 
(4)) we find that the expected effort is significantly higher for the two smallest starting differ-
ence than for an unknown starting difference in both treatments. Moreover, in NoCred ex-
pected effort is weakly significantly higher for a starting difference of 60=θ  and signifi-
cantly lower for the largest difference than for an unknown starting difference. Thus, one may 
conclude that – based on the principal’s beliefs – the principal should always reveal the two 
smallest starting differences; in NoCred she should also reveal the second largest and never 
reveal the largest starting difference. Thus, we may summarize the findings on hypothesis 3: 
                                                 
16  Again, we checked for the robustness of our results by running fixed effects regressions with the principals’ 
expectations as a dependent variable; the same coefficients as shown in Table 7 are significant. Additionally, the 
revelation of a starting difference of 40=θ  has a significantly positive effect on the expectation regarding 
effort in Cred compared to the case of non-revelation. 
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OBSERVATION ON HYPOTHESIS 3a: Average expected effort is significantly decreasing 
with an increasing starting difference revealed in both treatments. Moreover, in both 
treatments expected effort is significantly higher for the two smallest differences of 0=θ  
and 20=θ  if revealed than for an unknown difference. In NoCred the expected effort is 
higher for 60=θ  and lower for 80=θ  than for an unknown starting difference. If the 
agents learn the starting difference, the principal expects them to choose efforts that are 
significantly above the theoretic prediction for the starting differences 80=θ , 40=θ  
and 0=θ  in Cred and for the starting differences  80=θ , 60=θ  and 40=θ  in No-
Cred.  
OBSERVATION ON HYPOTHESIS 3b and 3c: If the agents do not learn the starting differ-
ence, the principal expects them to choose efforts which are significantly more often 
above the equilibrium prediction than below in both treatments. 
Comparing both treatments regarding the principal’s beliefs by applying the Mann-Whitney U 
test we find no significant difference. The comparison of the average efforts expected with the 
actual effort choices for each starting difference revealed and unrevealed yields some signifi-
cant differences: The expected effort is significantly higher in Cred for 20=θ  (α = 0.035, 
Mann-Whitney U test, two-tailed) and, interestingly, if the difference is not revealed the ac-
tual effort is significantly higher than expected in NoCred (α = 0.083, Mann-Whitney U test, 
two-tailed). Moreover, we find no indication for a change of behavior over rounds. 
 
3.3.4 Belief of Agent 
The agents were asked to state their belief regarding the decision of the principal in each 
round, i.e. they had to state whether they expected the principal to reveal the starting differ-
ence for each possible realization of the starting difference. Figure 5 depicts the average ex-
pectations per agent. 
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Figure 5: Average belief on revelation of starting difference in % 
Table 8 provides an overview of averages and an indication of whether differences are re-
vealed or not (see results of Binomial Test). Averages indicate that rather small starting dif-
ferences are expected to be revealed which is confirmed by the Binomial Test. Moreover, it 
seems as if expectations are more extreme for particularly small and large starting differences 
in Cred than in NoCred. 
 
Table 8: Average percentage of agents’ beliefs regarding the information revelation  
 Realization of starting differences |θ| 
 0 20 40 60 80 
Cred 75.56+++ 71.67+++ 52.22 33.52– – – 34.07– – – 
NoCred 57.22+++ 56.85+++ 52.41 45.93– – – 44.63– – – 
Mann-Whitney U test 
(one-tailed) 
α = 0.002 α = 0.013 ns α = 0.051 α = 0.050 
By using the Binomial Test (one-tailed) we state the level of significance at which the null hypothesis can be 
rejected in favor of the alternative hypothesis that the starting difference is expected to be more often revealed 
than not (+) respectively less often revealed than revealed (–): 
+  weakly significant:  0.05 < α ≤ 0.10 
++  significant:   0.01 < α ≤ 0.05 
+++  highly significant:  α ≤ 0.01 
–  weakly significant:  0.05 < α ≤ 0.10 
– –  significant:   0.01 < α ≤ 0.05 
– – –  highly significant:  α ≤ 0.01 
Running probit regressions (see Table 9) we find that the agents’ expectation that the princip-
al reveals the starting difference is increasing with a decreasing starting difference (regres-
sions (1) and (3)). Furthermore, they significantly more often expect the three smallest start-
ing differences to be revealed than the largest starting difference in both treatments (regres-
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sions (2) and (4)) which is roughly in line with the theoretic prediction. Checking for a change 
of behavior over rounds yields no significant result. 
Table 9: Probit regressions17 with agent’s belief as dependent variable (if revelation = 1, no 
revelation = 0) and robust standard errors over subjects 
 Cred NoCred 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Startingdifference -0.0161***  -0.00455*  
 (0.0028)  (0.0025)  
Difference0  1.103***  0.317* 
  (0.20)  (0.17) 
Difference20  0.983***  0.308* 
  (0.18)  (0.16) 
Difference40  0.466***  0.195**
  (0.14)  (0.099) 
Difference60  -0.0152  0.0327 
  (0.060)  (0.025) 
Constant 0.738*** -0.410*** 0.217* -0.135 
 (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12) 
Observations 2700 2700 2700 2700 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Thus, we can summarize the results regarding Hypothesis 4 as follows: 
OBSERVATION ON HYPOTHESIS 4a and 4b: In both treatments, the agents’ expectations 
regarding the principal’s revelation of the starting difference increase with a decreasing 
starting difference. In both treatments, the agents expect the principal to reveal the two 
smallest starting differences 0=θ  and 20=θ  and the three smallest starting differences 
significantly more often than the largest starting difference 80=θ . Moreover, they sig-
nificantly expect the principal not to reveal the two largest starting differences 60=θ  and 
80=θ . 
Comparing the agents’ expectations in both treatments Figure 5 already reveals that obviously 
agents expect revelation more often for the smallest starting differences in Cred than in No-
Cred and less often for the two largest starting differences which is confirmed by non-
parametric testing. Thus, the agents expect the principal to significantly more often reveal the 
second largest starting difference 60=θ  as well as the largest difference 80=θ  in NoCred 
than in Cred which is in contrast to our theoretic prediction. 
                                                 
17  We ran fixed effects regressions with the agents’ expectations as a dependent variable; the same coefficients 
as shown in Table 9 are significant.  
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We also compared the average expectation of each agent to the average actual tendency to 
reveal the starting difference of the principal in both treatments and found only a few differ-
ences.18  
 
3.3.5 Effect of Discrimination of Agents 
So far we have only analyzed average efforts aggregated over subjects being advantaged or 
disadvantaged by the realization of the starting difference. According to our theoretic predic-
tion effort is symmetric in equilibrium. However, being advantaged or disadvantaged by the 
starting difference can make a difference in such unfair tournaments for actual behavior as 
already shown by Schotter & Weigelt (1992). This study confirms that average effort exerted 
is significantly higher than theoretically predicted in unfair two-person tournaments similar to 
the setting we analyze in this study (see also Weigelt et al. 1989).19 Moreover, while their 
findings show that both – advantaged and disadvantaged subjects – exert higher efforts than 
predicted their results indicate that advantaged subjects exert higher efforts than disadvan-
taged ones. However, in most cases this difference is not significant. 
Table 10 provides an overview of the average efforts exerted by advantaged and disadvan-
taged agents for each starting difference. Interestingly, we find that the average efforts of ad-
vantaged agents are almost always significantly above the theoretic prediction (see results of 
the Binomial Test). The effort of disadvantaged subjects is neither more often above than be-
low the prediction except for the effort exerted in NoCred for a starting difference of 40 when 
effort is more often below the equilibrium effort than above. Comparing the effort of advan-
taged and disadvantaged subjects by using the Wilcoxon-Signed Rank test for dependent pairs 
for the efforts chosen by the two agents in each round we find that the effort of advantaged 
agents tends to be significantly higher than the effort of disadvantaged agents particularly for 
the two smallest starting differences. 
                                                 
18  Agents expect the principal to reveal the starting difference more often for 40=θ  in Cred (α = 0.057, Mann-
Whitney U test (two-tailed)) and less often for the two smallest starting differences in CredNoCred (α = 0.099 
for 0=θ  and α = 0.002 for 20=θ , both Mann-Whitney U test (two-tailed)). 
19  In a later study Orrison et al. (2004) find that only effort elicited by unfair two-person tournaments is higher 
than predicted. This effect is reduced if the number of participants increases. 
 28
Table 10: Average effort of advantaged and disadvantaged agents per starting difference if 
revealed  
 Realization of starting differences |θ| 
 20 40 60 80 
Cred Advantaged 52.27++ 55.04+++ 68.40+++ 38.09+++ 
Disadvantaged 43.46 37.30 39.80 28.55 
Wilcoxon-Signed Rank test (one-tailed) α = 0.092 α = 0.048 α = 0.038 ns 
NoCred Advantaged 57.94 64.27+++ 55.08+++ 42.82+++ 
Disadvantaged 43.88 23.36--- 39.67 22.27 
Wilcoxon-Signed Rank test (one-tailed) α = 0.059 α = 0.003 ns α = 0.099 
By using the Binomial Test (one-tailed) we state the level of significance at which the null hypothesis can be 
rejected in favor of the alternative hypothesis that the average effort of each agent is more often above the equi-
librium prediction than below: 
+  weakly significant:  0.05 < α ≤ 0.10 
++  significant:   0.01 < α ≤ 0.05 
+++  highly significant:  α ≤ 0.01 
 
 
We also ran regressions as shown by Table 5 using effort of advantaged and disadvantaged 
subjects as dependent variable. While the results indicate that the effort of advantaged agents 
increases with a decreasing starting difference we find no such results for disadvantaged 
agents in both treatments. Moreover, the separate analysis of advantaged and disadvantaged 
agents does not indicate any change of behavior over rounds. We can conclude by summariz-
ing our findings on hypothesis 5a: 
OBSERVATION ON HYPOTHESIS 5a: Effort exerted by the agents being advantaged by the 
realization of the revealed starting difference is significantly higher than the effort of dis-
advantaged agents for the two low starting differences 20=θ  and 40=θ  in both treat-
ments as well as for 60=θ  in Cred and for 80=θ  in NoCred. 
As the principal states her beliefs for each of the two agents separately we may also disentan-
gle her beliefs regarding the advantaged and the disadvantaged agent. Table 11 provides an 
overview of the respective principal’s beliefs. 
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Table 11: Average belief of effort of advantaged and disadvantaged agents per starting differ-
ence if revealed  
 Realization of starting differences |θ| 
 20 40 60 80 
Cred Advantaged 57.88 47.38 33.91 31.59+++ 
Disadvantaged 66.03+++ 62.10++ 52.27 41.83++ 
Wilcoxon-Signed Rank test (one-tailed) α = 0.002 α = 0.028 ns ns 
NoCred Advantaged 49.89 45.82 45.73++ 32.83 
Disadvantaged 59.88+++ 66.00+++ 70.82+++ 32.56 
Wilcoxon-Signed Rank test (one-tailed) α = 0.029 α = 0.006 α = 0.002 ns 
By using the Binomial Test (one-tailed) we state the level of significance at which the null hypothesis can be 
rejected in favor of the alternative hypothesis that the average expected effort of each agent is more often above 
the equilibrium prediction than below: 
+  weakly significant:  0.05 < α ≤ 0.10 
++  significant:   0.01 < α ≤ 0.05 
+++  highly significant:  α ≤ 0.01 
 
Comparing the average efforts with the theoretic prediction we find that the beliefs regarding 
efforts exerted by disadvantaged agents tend to be more often above the prediction than below 
in most cases. Moreover, Table 11 reveals that the principal rather expects disadvantaged 
agents to exert higher efforts than advantaged agents which can be summarized as follows:  
OBSERVATION ON HYPOTHESIS 5b: Principals expect the effort of agents being disadvan-
taged by the realization of the revealed starting difference to be significantly higher than 
that of advantaged agents for the two low starting differences 20=θ  and 40=θ  in both 
treatments as well as for 60=θ  in NoCred. 
This is in clear contrast to the actual behavior of agents as rather advantaged agents exert 
higher efforts than disadvantaged agents. Figure 6 compares the actual efforts exerted by ad-
vantaged and disadvantaged agents to the principal’s beliefs. However, differences are in 
most cases not statistically significant. Exceptions are the following using the Mann-Whitney 
U test, two-tailed: Advantaged agents in Cred 60=θ  (α = 0.035), disadvantaged agents in 
Cred 20=θ  (α = 0.007), advantaged agents in NoCred 40=θ  (α = 0.083), disadvantaged 
agents in NoCred 40=θ  (α = 0.005) and 60=θ  (α = 0.082). 
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Figure 6: Comparison of actual effort and belief for advantaged and disadvantaged agents  
 
4. Summary and discussion 
Summarizing the principals’ behavior first we may confirm that the principals’ decisions 
seem to be in line with the basic logic of the strategic setting analyzed here and, thus, princip-
als are more likely to reveal low than high starting differences. This behavior is consistent 
with the principals’ beliefs who expect agents’ efforts to be strictly decreasing in the starting 
difference, if the latter is revealed. Moreover, this behavior also seems to be an adequate re-
sponse to the agents’ actual efforts, as these efforts are indeed reduced, if the initial situation 
becomes less even. 
Comparing the two different treatments, our hypothesis concerning the principals’ decisions 
has not been confirmed. In particular, principals do not conceal information more often in the 
NoCred than in the Cred treatment. As principals do not expect the agents to behave different-
ly in the two treatments in case of a concealed starting difference, this behavior seems to be 
rational. Considering the agents’ actual efforts, however, we see that the principals misinterp-
ret the situation: As opposed to the principals’ beliefs, agents well choose higher efforts in 
NoCred than in Cred, if they are not informed about the starting difference. Moreover, the 
agents’ actual efforts for a concealed starting difference are significantly higher than for the 
largest starting difference. This is in line with the principals’ beliefs regarding the comparison 
of effort choices for the different situations within NoCred. Hence, it seems surprising that the 
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principals still seem to reveal the largest starting difference quite often in NoCred. They might 
have been better off, if they had acted according to the theoretic prediction. 
As indicated before, agents choose lower efforts, if a relatively high starting difference is re-
vealed. Although the actual efforts generally exceed the theoretic prediction, this is qualita-
tively in line with the model. Moreover, agents capture to some degree that a non-revelation 
of information is not best news, at least in the Cred treatment. As a consequence, they choose 
a lower effort in case information is withheld than if they know the starting difference to be 
zero. While a non-revelation of information, therefore, has an effect on the agents’ efforts, 
this effect is not as strong as theoretically predicted. This, however, is in line with the agents’ 
beliefs and the principals’ decisions, which are also not as extreme as predicted by the model. 
The agents’ decisions across the two treatments fit well to the model, too. If they learn the 
starting difference, efforts do not differ across the treatments. And, the agents correctly take 
into account that a non-revelation of information is more meaningful in Cred and, thus, 
choose a relatively higher effort in the NoCred treatment. 
If we disentangle the effort choices of agents being disadvantaged and advantaged by the rea-
lization of the starting difference we make a surprising observation: Actual effort choices of 
advantaged agents seem to be higher than those of disadvantaged agents. This is in contrast to 
our theoretic prediction according to which efforts should be symmetric in equilibrium. How-
ever, it seems in line with an earlier study by Schotter & Weigelt (1992). Note that the results 
by Schotter & Weigelt are somewhat weak and that other studies (Weigelt et al. 1989 as well 
as Orrison et al. 2004) find almost no significant difference between advantaged and disad-
vantaged agents. In all of these studies the degree of being disadvantaged resp. advantaged 
does not change within one treatment. Thus, we may conclude that if agents know that their 
initial position may change over rounds they might be tempted to seize the chance of a subjec-
tively perceived favorable position and exert a higher effort although this is not optimal.20 
In contrast, analyzing the principals’ beliefs shows that they rather expect disadvantaged 
agents to exert higher efforts than advantaged agents which is more pronounced for low start-
ing differences. Thus, the principals obviously misjudge the agents’ behavior. 
To conclude, the experimental findings support the theoretical model and can shortly be 
summarized as follows: 
                                                 
20  Harbring et al. (forthcoming) find that the emergence of the marginal cost of effort plays an important role for 
the exertion of efforts in an experiment on contests among asymmetric agents who may individually sabotage 
each other. Ex ante discrimination obviously discourages participants less than being sabotaged by others in a 
certain round. Their theoretic framework differs, however, considerably from ours. 
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1. Being informed about the initial standing, agents choose a lower effort the higher the 
starting difference. 
2. Principals correctly anticipate this behavior and are, thus, less likely to reveal their in-
formation the less even the initial situation. 
3. Agents correctly take into account that a non-revelation of information is more mea-
ningful in the Cred than in the NoCred treatment. Hence, if they are not informed 
about the initial standing, they choose a relatively lower effort in Cred. 
4. Principals, however, do not expect the agents to react differently in the two treatments 
if the information regarding the initial standing is not revealed. Consequently, they do 
not condition their decisions on the treatment. 
5. Agents being advantaged by the realization of the revealed starting difference tend to 
choose higher efforts than agents being disadvantaged. Principals, however, expect the 
opposite. 
 
5. Conclusion 
To sum up the behavior of principals and agents is quite well aligned, also in the light of their 
own expectations regarding the other participants’ behavior. The behavioral patterns qualita-
tively correspond to our theoretic predictions. However, we do not find a striking difference 
between the two situations analyzed. Thus, it seems as if it does not make much of a differ-
ence here whether information can credibly be revealed with certainty or only with some 
probability. 
Interestingly, in case of an unknown initial standing agents do not choose efforts as low as 
predicted by theory. Thus, one might conclude that principals do not need to worry about the 
necessity to disclose intermediate information whenever possible as it seems as if the effect of 
non-disclosure is not as strong as predicted. Note that this is not only important for the design 
of tournaments, but also for all other situations, where disclosure of information plays a role. 
One important result we find is that the heterogeneity created by the revelation of the inter-
mediate performance matters for the exertion of efforts although theory predicts that efforts 
should be symmetric in equilibrium. We observe an obvious misjudgment of the principals: 
While the advantaged agents tend to exert higher efforts than disadvantaged ones, principals 
expect exactly the opposite. Thus, principals need to be aware of the fact that they do not en-
hance the effort of the agents being behind by disclosing midterm results but rather discou-
rage them compared to the agents having a headstart. This surprising result definitely deserves 
further investigation. 
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Appendix A: Proofs of Lemma 1, 2 and Proposition 1, 2 
 
Proof of Lemma 1: 
Note first that the agents form expectations about the principal's feedback policy and, accor-
dingly, about the two sets 1B  and 2B . In equilibrium, these expectations must be correct. This 
means that the agents correctly anticipate the principal’s strategy and the sets of parameter 
values, for which the principal does and does not try to reveal her information. 
Bearing this in mind, the proof is by contradiction. Let the parameter realization be jθ  and 
suppose )()( θθ (gg j < . Further, let jθ  belong to 1B . This means that, after having observed 
this parameter realization, the principal is interested in revealing her information. This, how-
ever, is only possible, if [ ]ngEg j )()( θθ θ≥ . 
As )()( θθ (gg j < , it follows that [ ]ngEg )()( θθ θ>(  so that it is not profitable for the principal 
to conceal her information after having observed θ( . Hence, θ(  cannot belong to 2B , which is 
a contradiction and completes the proof of the lemma.                                                             ■ 
 
Proof of Lemma 2: 
The proof is again by contradiction. Suppose that the parameter realization is Θθ ˆˆ∈ . Per de-
finition, the principal then does not reveal her information. Hence, the agents' equilibrium 
effort is given by 
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Then, however, the principal gains from deviating and revealing her information about θ . 
Therefore, in equilibrium )~()ˆ( θθ gg >  cannot hold. As )~()ˆ( θθ gg ≥ , by Definition 2, it di-
rectly follows that )~()ˆ( θθ gg = , for all Θθ ˆˆ∈  and Θθ ~~∈ .                                                      ■ 
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Proof of Proposition 1: 
Combining Lemma 1 and 2, we can directly see that the principal always reveals her informa-
tion, if Θθ ∉ . Hence, if information is not revealed, the agents believe that Θθ ∈ . This im-
plies that the principal is indifferent between revealing and concealing her information, if 
Θθ ∈ .                                                                                                                                ■ 
 
Proof of Proposition 2: 
We start by demonstrating that the principal always conceals her information, if )()( θθ gg = . 
If this were not true, it must be that [ ] [ ]nigEpgEpg )()1()()( θθθ θθ ⋅−+⋅≥ . Note that the 
term [ ] )()1()( θθθ gpgEp ⋅−+⋅  describes a lower bound for the right-hand-side of the ine-
quality. As )(θg  is not a constant, we have [ ] )()( θθθ ggE >  and, accordingly, 
[ ] )()()1()( θθθθ ggpgEp >⋅−+⋅ . This implies that the inequality can never be satisfied and 
completes the first part of the proof. 
From Lemma 1, we further know that the principal decides to conceal her information up to a 
certain point (i.e. up to a certain value )(θg ), at which it becomes profitable to reveal her in-
formation. Denote this value by gˆ . It is easy to show that [ ])(ˆ θθ gEg ≥  can never hold. To 
see this, note first that the principal is indifferent between concealing and revealing her infor-
mation, if [ ]ngEg )()( θθ θ= . Now, let (in contradiction to the proposition) [ ] tgEg += )(ˆ θθ , 
with 0≥t . The condition [ ]ngEg )(ˆ θθ=  can then be transformed into 
[ ] [ ] [ ]nigEpgEptgE )()1()()( θθθ θθθ ⋅−+⋅=+ . For t=0, we have [ ] [ ])()( θθ θθ gEnigE <  
(this follows from Lemma 1) and the condition [ ]ngEg )(ˆ θθ=  is violated. Similarly, for t> 0, 
the expression on the left-hand-side of the condition is strictly higher than [ ])(θθ gE , while 
the corresponding expression on the right-hand side is weakly smaller than [ ])(θθ gE . Hence, 
the condition can never be satisfied. This means that the cut-off value gˆ  must lie within the 
(open) interval [ ]))(),(( θθ θ gEg  and completes the proof of the proposition.                         ■ 
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Appendix B: Experimental Instructions: Treatment Cred 
 
Throughout the experiment any amount will be measured in the fictitious currency “Taler”. 
There are participants Y and participants X. At the beginning of the experiment a random 
move decides about whether you become participant Y or participant X. You keep your role 
throughout the entire experiment. 
In each round you only play with participants who belong to your group. Every group con-
sists of three participants: one participant Y and two participants X, who are called X1 
and X2 due to distinction. 
In each round your group consists of different participants such that you will never play with 
the same participant more than once. 
The experiment described as follows consists of 9 rounds. 
 
Decision by participant Y 
At the beginning of each round participant Y gets to know the starting numbers of participants 
X1 and X2 in his group.  
Participant Y has to decide, whether he wants to disclose the starting numbers to partici-
pants X1 and X2 or whether he wants to keep them secret. 
The starting numbers are announced to participants X1 and X2, if participant Y decides to 
disclose them. Otherwise, participants X1 and X2 receive the following message: 
“You do not get to know your starting numbers this round, since participant Y decided 
not to disclose them in this round.” 
Finally, participant Y is asked to conjecture the numbers chosen by his fellow group mem-
bers X1 and X2 in this particular round. 
 
Decision of participant X 
At the beginning of each round participants X are asked to conjecture, whether participant 
Y is going to disclose their starting numbers or not. They are asked to do this conjecture 
for all 5 possible starting differences. 
The starting numbers for participants X1 and X2 are newly-drawn at the beginning of each 
round. A random move decides about who of these two participants gets a starting number 
of 0 and who gets a starting number out of the set {0, 20, 40, 60, 80}. Each starting number of 
the given set is realized with the same probability. 
Therefore, in each round one participant X has a starting number of 0 and the other participant 
X has a starting number out of the set {0, 20, 40, 60, 80}. Hence, there exist 5 possible start-
ing differences, i.e. 5 possible differences between the starting numbers: {0, 20, 40, 60, 80}. 
Participants X only get to know their starting numbers, if participant Y decided to disclose 
them. 
In each round both participants X select an integer out of the set {0, 1, …, 100}. Each num-
ber is associated with certain costs. These costs rise by the selected number and are given by 
the attached table. 
The computer draws a random integer out of the set {-50, -49, …, 0, …, 49, 50} for  
each of the two players. Every number from the set is equally likely to be drawn. 
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Payment per round for participant X 
 
The selected numbers by the participants, the random numbers drawn and the starting  
numbers determine the payment in a round as follows: 
The participant with the higher result gets a high payment of 1800 Taler, while the other 
participant with the lower result gets a low payment of 800 Taler. (In case of identical re-
sults there is a fair coin flip to determine the participant who gets the high and the participant 
who gets the low payoff.) The costs for the own number are subtracted from this payment. 
The outcome of this is the payment in this round. 
The result and the payment in a round are determined as follows: 
Preliminary result = number + random number 
Result = preliminary result + starting number = number + random number + starting number 
Payment in a round to participant X = high (low) payment – costs of own number 
 
In addition, every participant X receives a bonus of 100 Taler, if his conjecture is correct 
regarding participant Y’s disclosure of the starting numbers in this particular round. If his 
conjecture proves to be wrong, he does not receive a bonus payment. 
Every participant X learns after each round whether he received a high or low payment as 
well as his payment for this round and the starting numbers of both participants. He gets to 
 know the sum of his bonus payments at the end of the experiment. 
 
Payment per round for participant Y 
Participant Y receives a lump-sum payment of 800 Taler per round, as well as 5 times the sum 
of the preliminary results of his fellow group members X1 and X2 in this  round: 
 
Payment in a round for participant Y = 800 + 5 * (preliminary result X1 + preliminary re-
sult X2) 
 
In addition, each participant Y receives a bonus payment of 50 Taler for each number of 
participants X1 and X2 that he conjectured correctly in this round. Therefore, the bonus 
payment in a round can amount to a maximum of 2 * 50 = 100 Taler. The amount of the dif-
ference between conjecture and actual number will be subtracted from the 50 Taler. The min-
imum bonus payment is zero. 
After each round all participants Y learn their payment for the round, the preliminary results, 
the results and, as a reminder, the starting numbers of participants X1 and X2. The sum of 
their bonus payments is announced to them at the very end of the experiment. 
All participants receive a lump-sum payment of 2500 Taler at the beginning of the experi-
ment. 
At the end of the experiment the sum of payments from all rounds is given to the participants 
at an exchange rate of 1 Euro for 1000 Taler. The payments are conducted anonymously. 
 
Thank you very much for participating in the experiment! 
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